Archimedes' Point

In search of just one thing.

Name: Brendan Ritchie
Location: Beltsville, Maryland, United States

Tuesday, March 01, 2005

Elimination and Memory

I am writing a paper on this topic, and so post the main structure of the argument here for comments:

Traditionally, psychology has distinguished between the categories of learning and memory(for us philosophy kids: psychology thinks learning and memory are distinct natural kinds).
I think this is wrong: we should eliminate memory, and replace all talk of it just with talk of learning. This is because learning and memory are the same thing (same category, kind etc.)
The argument basically goes as follows(see below argument for some brief elaboration):

1. Learning and memory both distinguish between conscious and unconscious states within their respective categories (explicit-implicit learning, and declarative-nondeclarative memory)

2. Explicit learning (which includes relational learning) refers to the same sort of phenomena as declarative memory.

3. Implicit learning (stimulus-response learning, al a classical conditioning. Also perceptual learning and motor learning) refers to the same sort of phenomena as non-declarative memory.

4. The leading hypothesis for the neural basis of memory is of long-term potentiation in the hippocampus and parts of the cerebral cortex. LTP is a form of neural learning, which involves building up of synaptic connections (roughly speaking: how LTP works is still FAR from certain).

5. Learning and memory seem to make the same sort of distinctions, describe the same sort of phenomena, and involve the same sort of neural processes. Therefore, learning and memory are the same thing.

I only say memory is in fact learning because of 4. And because my intuition is that learning seems a more "basic" process in some vague way. But for me, it is just a term. You could call the one category that replaces learning and memory "Memory", "Lemory", or "Mearning" for all I care. We are not losing any theoretical distinctions we had under learning and memory, I am just changing how we identify them.

1. For the first premise, there are some who do not think there is an implicit-explicit distinction in the case of stimulus-response learning and relational learning (the pair instead being referred to as Associative Learning). I disagree, and I think most psychologist do too. Certainly most textbooks identify something like the explicit-implicit distinction. I take 1 to be fairly uncontroversial.

2. Declarative memory involves remembering and knowing. Remembering is recall of a past experience, while knowing is recall of general facts (like nation capitals). Endel Tulving has the most popular theoretical distinction to go along with remembering and knowing: episodic and semantic memory.
In learning research on relational learning, they usually refer to things like remembering of past experiences or recall of facts as examples: sounds like episodic and semantic memory to me.

3. Memory research talks about non-declarative memory as involving things like knowing how to ride a bike, or internalizing rules unconsciously. Implicit learning, like stimulus-response learning is involved in things like learning to ride bikes, a long with motor learning. Ok, these so seem like the same thing.

4. I think this one speaks for itself: decay in memory follows power laws, so does consolidation. Surprise, so does LTP. By itself 4 works as a case for reducing memory to learning, but with 1-3 it seems like we are really talking about the same thing and elimination is warranted.

I haven't said anything about actual experiments or anything, and that is on purpose. I am interested to know what sort of intuition pumps people might have against me. The interesting thing is that usually paradigm examples of learning are also paradigm examples of memory. My bet is any example someone comes up with that is suppose to be only a case of one, is also considered to be a case of the other.

There are of course, some problems:

What about the working memory, long-term memory distinction? Hmm, I think that under any reasonable definition of memory, working memory doesn't count as memory. Working memory doesn't seem to be a case of encoding something, but rather of keeping something active. Memory involves encoding, not just keeping something going until you do not need it anymore.

What about word-stem completion tasks? someone gets you to read words of a screen while other words are, say, flashed so fast you cannot consciously perceive them. If the words is boat, and later you are presented with, say "_ _ at", there is a high probability of you saying boat. Well if memory is learning, what sort of learning is this?
My guy says this is a case of stimulus-response learning: that is right, a form of conditioning. If we can condition motor behaviour, and reflexes, I see no reason we cannot condition verbal responses. Stimulus-response learning seems cogntive enough that it could cause verbal responses in certain cases.

Thoughts?

1 Comments:

Anonymous Corey Maley said...

This is an interesting idea, and I have some concerns/comments.

First, and most obvious, learning is a process, while memory is a kind of thing. One can imagine many ways in which a person (or cognitive system generally) might have memories, but with no capacity to learn, and possibly even without having ever learned. It seems that memories could be "hard-wired." However, it seems strange to think that something could learn without any memories being formed. In any case, there's clearly a relationship between learning and memory, but they don't seem to be the same thing to me.

As another example, I don't know exactly how one could account for so-called false memories if the concepts of memory and learning are conjoined. Intuitively, it seems that false memories are either memories in which certain details have been altered, or one or more distinct memories that have merged. What would be the conception of "lemory" that would allow for things like this to occur, in which a (presumably) accurate memory turns into an inaccurate memory? Keeping memory and learning distinct seems to allow for better explanations of certain phenomena, like this one. Insisting on there really being just one thing doesn't seem to buy you anything. Maybe you could come up with a conception of "lemory" that would account for all of the interesting cases, but, on the surface at least, it seems like it would have to be a very convoluted, highly context-sensitive entity.

corey.maley@gmail.com

6:43 AM  

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